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The Significance of 
Joint Missile Surveillance
John Steinbruner
At a summit meeting in Moscow in September of 1998, the pres-idents of the United States and Russia signed an agreement toshare information on the launch of ballistic missiles. The
announcement was not received as a major accomplishment. There had
been a minimum amount of bureaucratic preparation within the two gov-
ernments and only cursory negotiation between them. The essential
details were yet to be worked out and would obviously be troublesome.
Moreover, at the time of the meeting neither of the individuals involved
commanded the personal political authority normally considered nec-
essary to sponsor a meaningful venture. The visiting President Clinton
was entangled in the blooming phases of an impeachment proceeding.
The hosting President Yeltsin was widely believed to be in the waning
stages of personal health and political stature. 
Despite the burdens of the moment, however, the agreement was
intrinsically significant. It addressed an underlying problem grave enough
to compel attention regardless of the circumstances. There were reasons
to take the core idea seriously whatever immediate sentiment might be. 
The problem was then and still remains a legacy of the cold war.
Although not proclaiming themselves to be strategic opponents, Russia
and the United States nonetheless continuously maintain thousands of
nuclear weapons in an operational state poised to initiate a massive attack
within a few minutes. As a result of that practice, each country constantly
presents to the other the greatest physical threat that it encounters from
any source. The force configurations are justified as protective deterrent
threats, whose overwhelming destructiveness are meant to assure that
no such attack will ever occur. But as an unavoidable corollary of that
logic, each side must also convey credible reassurance that no error of
judgment would ever be made. Both countries for their own safety must
be absolutely certain that the forces of the other side are not susceptible
to false alarm. The two societies entangled in this active deterrent rela-
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tionship are forced to trust each other on that latter point. 
Their capacity to sustain that trust differs substantially. The United
States operates a comprehensive warning system which provides reliable
assurance that any large scale attack emanating from Russian forces
would be detected by infrared sensors in space a few minutes after launch
and would be confirmed by ground based radar approximately fifteen
minutes before impact. Since the United States can detect attack with
high confidence, it can also assure Russia that it would not falsely per-
ceive an attack that had not in fact been launched and would not retal-
iate by mistake. Russia is not in position to offer comparable assur-
ance. The warning system it inherited from the Soviet Union is not
complete and does not provide either continuous or comprehensive
surveillance of attack corridors with even a single method of detection.1
As a result, Russia is inherently more susceptible to confusion and can-
not offer comparable assurance against false perception of attack. That
fact is a problem for the United States, and it creates a very serious incen-
tive to strengthen the Russian warning system — the implicit purpose of
the 1998 agreement. 
Unfortunately, acknowledgment of the problem has not matched
its intrinsic importance. At the height of cold war confrontation when
the inherent interest in conveying mutual reassurance was most press-
ing, that feature of the deterrent relationship was not explicitly articu-
lated or broadly appreciated. The security bureaucracies were generally
aware of it in their inner deliberations, but clearly subordinated it to their
predominant commitment to preserve the capacity for overwhelming
destruction. When the sense of confrontation dissolved in the after-
math of the cold war, a massive deterrent capability was preserved but
that fact and the reasoning behind it receded as a public concern. To put
it mildly, the American and Russian security bureaucracies were not pre-
pared for intimate collaboration at the time of the 1998 summit, and
their respective constituencies were not insisting on it. The prevailing
instinct was to treat the summit initiative as a symbolic exercise that
would not meaningfully alter national surveillance practices and certainly
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1 Geoffrey Forden, Pavel Podvig, and Theodore Postol, “False Alarm, Nuclear
Danger,” IEEE Spectrum (March 2000): 31-39.
would not reveal their operational details. The implementation discus-
sions that followed the summit reflected that attitude. Even that reluc-
tant exercise was suspended in the Spring of 1999 as a result of sharp
Russian objections to the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia dur-
ing the Kosovo crisis. 
The idea of joint missile surveillance enjoyed some revival and a brief
practical demonstration as a result of concern over possible threats to
computer operating systems with the arrival of the year 2000. Although
the United States was reasonably confident that its surveillance system
would not be disrupted, that judgment admitted to some uncertainty and
did not extend equally to Russia. Since public discussion of
the millennial transition featured speculation about the pos-
sibility of unintended missile launches and warning system fail-
ures, there was an incentive for both sides to collaborate in a
demonstration of prudent precaution. From December 21,
1999 to January 16, 2000, eighteen Russian military officers
worked with American counterparts at a temporary missile
monitoring center established at Peterson Air Force Base in
Colorado, near but not actually at the principal national sur-
veillance center located within Cheyenne Mountain. The experience was
reported to be very congenial to both sides, and the millennial transition
presented no major problems. 
By the spring of 2000, Vladimir Putin had been elected to the Russ-
ian presidency and the divisive emotions inspired by the Kosovo episode
were receding. Russian resentment was also mitigated somewhat by
muted American reactions to their own entanglement in Chechnya. It
was a natural occasion to revisit the security relationship with the Unit-
ed States, and in that context efforts to implement the 1998 agreement
were revived. But there was a new complication as well. In July of 1999,
President Clinton had signed legislation declaring it to be the intention
of the United States to deploy a national missile defense (NMD) system
as soon as technologically possible. No such system could be legally
deployed without amending the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty.
Russia, as principal successor to the Soviet Union, considered the treaty
to be a fundamental pillar of all security agreements with the United
States. In pursuit of the legislated policy, the United States had advanced









insistent demands for treaty amendments that would allow what was
represented as a limited national missile defense deployment. Russian
military planners had concluded that they could not accept the terms
offered. 
By the time that Presidents Clinton and Putin met for the first time
in June of 2000, it was apparent that the disagreement over the ABM
treaty would not be quickly resolved and would pose an indefinite prob-
lem for the security relationship between their countries. After lengthy
delay, the Russian Duma had ratified the START II treaty providing for
a scheduled reduction of actively deployed nuclear weapons. That out-
come, however, would not fundamentally alter the operational configu-
ration of forces, their destructive potential, or the traditional deterrent
relationship. Moreover, legal implementation of the treaty would not
occur as a practical matter until the ABM treaty question had been
resolved. In an apparent effort to work around the impasse, the two
politicians turned again to the joint missile surveillance idea. They signed
a Memorandum of Agreement to establish a Joint Data Exchange Cen-
ter (JDEC) in Moscow “for the exchange of information derived from
each side’s missile launch warning systems on the launches of ballistic
missiles and space launch vehicles.”2 The agreement specified the infor-
mation to be exchanged, the location of the center and a number of legal
and administrative arrangements. The announcement proclaimed it to
be the first time that the United States and Russia would conduct a per-
manent joint operation involving military personnel. In December 2000,
the United States Secretary of State Madeline Albright, and the Russian
Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, signed a follow-on Memorandum of
Understanding, specifying in greater detail how the JDEC system for
exchanging notifications of missile launches would operate.3
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2 Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on the Establishment of a Joint Center for the Exchange
of Data from Early Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile Launches,
June 4, 2000. See the document at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/jdec/text/
000604-warn-wh3.htm
3 Memorandum of Understanding on Notification of Missile Launches. Bureau
of Arms Control, Department of State, (released January 19, 2001),
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/mou_msllaunch.html
One month later, however, the inauguration of George W. Bush as
President of the United States effectively suspended the project. His
administration arrived in office more dedicated to the deployment of mis-
sile defenses, less inclined to collaborate with Russia and generally sus-
picious of anything that the Clinton administration had done. The JDEC
agreement was submitted to internal political review along with many
other pending actions, and it did not emerge from that process when Bush
and Putin met for the first time in June of 2001. The general idea of shar-
ing missile launch information appears to have been on the agenda for
discussion, but there was no indication the two leaders even attempted
to engage contentious details, such as Russian tax policy, that had immo-
bilized the project. As the two presidents met in Slovenia, the building
designated to house JDEC sat abandoned in Moscow on an overgrown lot
and was reportedly being used by local teenagers as a drinking hangout.4
The Relentless Problem
That will not be the end of the story. Whatever the ultimate fate of the
specific JDEC agreement, the underlying problem of reassurance will cer-
tainly persist and is likely to become ever more serious as Russia strug-
gles to regenerate its economy. Given the monumental burdens of that
process, Russia cannot reasonably afford the financial investment that
would be required to operate its inherited deterrent force at high stan-
dards of safety.5 Its command system is subject to internal deterioration,
and the implications of that fact are significantly more demanding than
has yet been admitted in the ebb and flow of presidential politics. 
The act of creating JDEC or some equivalent successor would not
alone solve the problem. The specified arrangement is politically cau-
tious in that it limits the information to be exchanged well short of what
the national surveillance systems actually collect. If that limited exchange
were to be accepted by both sides as a reliable source of reassurance, that
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lems on Missile Defense,” The Washington Post, June 13, 2001. 
5 The pressures imposed on the Russian military establishment are discussed in
more detail in John Steinbruner, Principles of Global Security, Washington
DC, the Brookings Institution Press, 2000, chapters 2 and 6. 
would be a seminal development with broad implications for global secu-
rity relationships. If it turned out, however, that the imposed limitations
generate suspicion rather than reassurance, the consequences could be
directly dangerous. As with most human activities, it probably is possi-
ble for JDEC or its equivalent to muddle along without decisive conse-
quence one way or the other, but in guiding its development and assess-
ing its ultimate significance it is important to consider both the good and
the harm it can potentially do. 
The difference between an arrangement that conveys reassurance and
one that breeds suspicion turns primarily on the scope and the timing of
the information that is exchanged. If the parties to the arrangement were
to share all warning sensor data as it is generated, if they were to apply
exactly the same interpretative algorithms at exactly the same time,
and if they were completely confident of the integrity of the
system—that is, that it could not be subverted or suddenly ter-
minated for aggressive advantage—then the possibility of delib-
erate deception or inadvertent confusion would be minimized
and reassurance would be as robust as the most advanced
capacity for surveillance is able to make it. To the extent that
there are categorical restrictions, interpretative filters, and/or
time delays imposed on the exchange, however, then the scope
for suspicion and the risk of perverse effects would increase—
by amounts that unfortunately do not admit to definitive measurement.
It is evident that the JDEC agreement as announced in June of 2000 does
not provide for the comprehensive exchange that would set the highest
imaginable standards of reassurance. It is not evident whether the more
limited exchange projected will exceed the uncertain threshold necessary
to assure that the result does more good than harm. 
The information to be provided under the JDEC agreement does
appear to be extensive enough to indicate constructive intent. Article 3
of the document determines that information “shall be exchanged” on
surveillance observations of:
• all launches of ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] and SLBMs
[submarine-launched ballistic missiles] of the United States of Ameri-
ca and the Russian Federation; 
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that the result does
more good than harm. 
• launches of ballistic missiles, that are not ICBMs or SLBMs, of the Unit-
ed States of America and the Russian Federation; 
• launches of ballistic missiles of third states that could pose a direct
threat to the Parties or that could create an ambiguous situation and
lead to possible misinterpretation; 
• launches of space launch vehicles. 
Appendix 3 of the agreement determines that the reported informa-
tion is to include the launch time down to the minute; geographic coor-
dinates of initial launch position down to the minute of latitude and lon-
gitude; the generic missile type (SLBM, ICBM, etc); the launch azimuth
down to the degree of azimuth; the estimated impact area to an accura-
cy to be specified later; estimated time of payload impact down to the
minute; and a determination of whether single or multiple objects have
been launched. All of that specified information is to be previously
processed and filtered in the respective national surveillance systems. Sen-
sor information is not to be directly shared. The reported information is
to be provided “in a time frame that is near real time, if possible.” Under
those terms Russia will receive essentially the same information from the
United States missile surveillance system that has long been circulated to
its allies and to those regional military commands not directly involved
in the main nuclear force operations. To the American participants those
provisions are sincerely considered to be a major gesture of good faith,
and they are indeed remarkable when assessed against historical practices. 
When assessed in terms of the central problem, however, the JDEC
agreement is less remarkable and its adequacy is more questionable. The
information exchanges are to be implemented over time, in specified
stages that are not associated with particular dates. It is not clear how
soon the final stage will be accomplished or what additional conditions
might be attached. Even at the most advanced stage, the agreement does
not provide for any specification of the statistical uncertainties associat-
ed with the launch parameters to be reported. Without that information
it will be very difficult to compare the filtered JDEC data with nation-
ally acquired data. The specification of launch time, position and azimuth
is much less precise than the standards that prevail within the Ameri-
can national system, so much so that the specification of impact position
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and impact time based on the reported parameters would be too crude
to be operationally useful. Similarly the categorical distinction between
single and multiple launches would not tell operational commanders
what they would most need to know – the exact size and targeted loca-
tions of any attack. These limitations are clearly designed to protect the
underlying surveillance systems from direct scrutiny by the participating
partner. That manifestation of residual distrust clearly overrides the desire
to convey reassurance. The result is that JDEC as currently contemplat-
ed will not provide the supplemental surveillance capacity to Russia that
would be necessary to solve the fundamental problem of reassurance.
The question of whether on balance JDEC would be constructive or detri-
mental depends heavily on how the initial arrangement would evolve
over time. 
Incremental Improvements
In principle there are four basic options for pursuing incremental
improvements in the JDEC agreement. First, the context under which it
operates could be improved by extending financial and technical assis-
tance to the Russian surveillance system, thereby diminishing the burden
of compensating for its deficiencies. Second, JDEC’s own operations
could be improved by increasing the specificity of the information
exchanged in managed stages for the entire surveillance area, so that it
begins to approach complete integration of the national systems. Third,
comprehensive information exchanges could be initiated in limited areas
and then gradually expanded to approach geographically inclusive cov-
erage. Fourth, additional participants could be introduced, thereby giv-
ing the initial bilateral effort multilateral standing and creating the pos-
sibility of a more globally inclusive system in the future. And, of course,
various combinations of these approaches could be devised. 
There has been some technical and political exploration of a proj-
ect to improve the respective Russian and American national surveillance
systems by joint development and operation of two satellites which
together would provide stereoscopic imagery in the infrared spectrum
using advanced processing techniques. In principle such a program, being
advanced under the label RAMOS for Russian-American observation
satellite, would allow both countries to improve their current ability to
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detect and track ballistic missiles in their boost phase. Simultaneous imag-
ing from widely separated viewing angles would allow infrared sensors
to determine trajectory information with considerable precision and
would therefore enable accurate estimates of warhead impact to be made
at the moment of boost termination. The same technique would also pro-
vide three dimensional background data that would be useful for track-
ing missile payloads beyond the boost phase as well as for broader pur-
poses such as weather prediction and environmental monitoring. A joint
effort to enhance the national surveillance systems would reinforce JDEC
operations and would diminish the risk of perverse consequences. Russ-
ian early warning capacity could also be improved through direct Amer-
ican technical and financial assistance, but bilateral aid would not have
as strong a reinforcing effect as an integrated joint venture.6
As yet, however, the RAMOS program has not been enacted, nor has
the proposal been connected to the JDEC initiative by either government.
With regard to JDEC, the expressed American inclination is to pursue
the second of the options for incremental improvement and to do so in
cautious stages that would depend upon successful implementation of
each stage, beginning with the initial agreement. The apparent Russian
inclination is to pursue some combination of the third and fourth options.
In implicit critique of the initial agreement, at least some knowledgeable
Russians are suggesting these latter forms of expansion as an immediate
priority likely to be helpful, perhaps even necessary in implementing the
initial agreement. 
The American approach implicitly assumes that the critical thresh-
old will be exceeded at the outset and that the process of evolution will
be constructive at whatever pace it is able to occur. The Russian approach
implicitly questions whether the critical threshold will be exceeded by
the initial agreement and suggests that additional initiative may be imme-
diately necessary to assure a constructive result. 
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be accomplished believe that bilateral aid to the Russian national surveillance
system should be the primary method of reassurance. See Geoffrey E. Forden,
“World War III? Now?” The New York Times, Op-Ed, September 6, 2000.
The differing approaches reflect the differing circumstances of the
two governments. It is natural for the United States to want to protect
the technical and operational details of its more advanced surveillance
network. It is natural for the Russians to be less concerned about reveal-
ing the inner workings of its less capable system—given that its limita-
tions are clearly known—and to be more interested in the operational
significance of the information received. The Russian judgment seems to
be that they have a better chance of acquiring high quality information
if it is focused on a third party of mutual concern – on Iran, for example
– than if they attempt to induce the United States to provide full sur-
veillance detail covering the attack corridors that the United States itself
might use. As a practical matter it is difficult to quarrel with that implic-
it judgment. Moreover, the fact that Russia has the greater surveillance
problem is an intrinsic reason to accede to the Russian pref-
erence for incremental improvement. 
The obvious difficulty with that rule, however, is that
American surveillance capacities do not fundamentally differ
by area of application. If more detailed information were to be
provided for missile trajectories emanating from Iran or from
any other specified area, these data would document general
capabilities and might give Russia a more precise understand-
ing of American technology than it currently has. If JDEC were
to include other participants, as the Russians have also sug-
gested, most of the possible candidates probably would acquire
a substantially improved understanding of American capabilities. The
United States could still preserve its operational secrets as long as reports
to the joint center consisted of interpreted results rather than the raw
sensor output or the processing algorithms used to derive the reported
data. Nonetheless, an incremental strategy that involves the sharing of
advanced detail in a limited area poses a sharper and earlier conflict
between secrecy and reassurance than does the currently preferred Amer-
ican approach. 
Well, no pain, no gain, as the saying goes. If the United States is not
willing to pay any significant price in the currency of secrecy, then it is
not likely to achieve any meaningful progress on the problem of reas-
surance. It is not clear that this practical fact has yet been explicitly
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acknowledged. It is quite unlikely that an enduring balance of these com-
peting interests has yet been set. 
It is reasonable to assume that JDEC, however it might evolve, will
not be directly harmful and probably will be modestly helpful under nor-
mal conditions – that is, outside the context of a potentially imminent
military confrontation. A meaningful incremental improvement was
achieved in the Albright-Ivanov Memorandum of Understanding, which
extended the scope of prior agreements for reporting missile launches in
advance and as they occur. Under the terms of that understanding, it
should be easy to determine on any given day that a missile attack is not
occurring and easy as well to identify and explain those missile launch-
es that do occur. 
But unfortunately normal circumstances are not the primary source
of concern, nor are the occasional events when an unanticipated missile
launch or a misperceived natural phenomenon causes some immediate
confusion. A truly serious problem of reassurance would only arise in
the context of a confrontation between the United States and Russia, but
even the mildest version of such a situation—one similar, for example,
to the tensions over Kosovo in 1999—would dramatically increase the
danger of a false alarm. The disparities in capacity between the United
States and Russia extend through all aspects of military operations,
and as a result Russian deterrent forces are inherently quite vulnerable
to preemptive attack, even from conventional tactical air forces. In com-
pensation for that fact, Russia relies heavily on rapid timing of retalia-
tory operations in order to assure their credibility. That doctrine impos-
es a burden on their national surveillance system that it could not reliably
carry if the United States chose for whatever reason to conduct a sys-
tematic preemptive attack. Given that underlying condition, the burden
on JDEC would intensify rapidly and dramatically in the initial stages of
any military confrontation. Under those circumstances it is far from evi-
dent that in either its currently projected or incrementally evolved form
JDEC could guarantee a constructive effect or even a neutral one. An
ostensibly successful JDEC doomed by its limitations to fail under the
pressures of a crisis would be a potential catastrophe waiting to happen.
Admittedly the chance of a catastrophe seems so speculative and so
remote under normal circumstances that most people are willing to
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assume it can be safely ignored. If any nuclear reactor design were sub-
ject to a comparably evident failure mode, however, it would never be
licensed; and no nuclear reactor accident would be as destructive as an
inadvertently triggered nuclear force engagement. It is doubtful that such
glaring disparities in standards of safety can be indefinitely preserved. 
More Venturesome Possibilities
The incentive to solve the underlying problem of reassurance and to
remove the inherent risk of a catastrophic breakdown of the JDEC oper-
ation is certainly strong enough to warrant a serious exploration of more
advanced arrangements. Those would presumably involve both sub-
stantial American assistance to the Russian surveillance system and a cat-
egorical rather than merely incremental extension of the information
exchanged between the national systems. Such a program would require
not only a significant revision of the JDEC agreement but a reformula-
tion as well of basic security objectives and operating principles. If the
degree of collaboration envisaged under JDEC is to be developed to the
point that it approaches a complete integration of surveillance opera-
tions, reliably protected against antagonistic national exploitation, then
early in the process – probably at the outset – new concepts of security
would have to be accepted. 
One can argue on common sense grounds that a fundamental revi-
sion of security policy is long overdue at any rate. Other than institu-
tionalized habit, there is no apparent reason for Russia and the United
States to sustain deterrent force operations that have the same basic char-
acter and essentially the same lethal potential as those conducted during
the course of the cold war. The residual requirement for protective deter-
rence can be adequately and far more safely achieved with smaller forces
that are not operated under constant alert conditions and are not com-
mitted to the massive, rapidly enacted retaliatory attacks that impose so
much pressure on the surveillance systems. That adjustment is particu-
larly urgent for Russia, which cannot reasonably expend the financial
resources necessary to maintain forces in the prevailing configuration.
For the United States, as leader of an alliance system with comprehen-
sive and overwhelming military superiority, there is no reason to fear the
implacable forms of deliberate aggression that were once thought to jus-
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tify an enormous deterrent force, actively operated. There is, by contrast,
quite compelling reason to fear the deterioration of managerial control
within a Russia military establishment subjected for a decade now to seri-
ous underfinancing. Reassurance is the predominant American interest
and the primary Russian need. Deterrence is a secondary matter easily
achieved. 
If these inexorable facts of the situation are acknowledged, as they
will ultimately have to be, then some important implications for the shar-
ing of information can readily be derived. There is an assertive interest
on both sides for immediate and extensive integration of missile sur-
veillance information including the radar signals, the infrared sensor out-
put and the interpretative algorithms used to derive tracking informa-
tion. The risk of a catastrophic failure of reassurance that results from
the limitations imposed on the JDEC agreement is not worth running,
however uncertain it is considered to be. In setting up an extensively inte-
grated surveillance system, neither side would be forced to reveal any-
thing that it is not in its interest to reveal. They could give complete access
to the output of the sensors, for example, without describing their inter-
nal mechanics, if that technology is considered a legitimate state secret.
In order to set an adequate standard of mutual confidence they pre-
sumably would have to reveal the interpretative algorithms applied to
the sensor output, but that process is far more likely to improve the state
of the art to mutual benefit that it is to introduce any meaningful nation-
al risk. The result would assure that no ballistic missile could be launched
anywhere in the surveillance area without both sides knowing about it
at exactly the same time with exactly the same precision. In setting up
such an arrangement they would, of course, compromise their national
capability to initiate a preemptive attack on the surveillance system part-
ner – a concession that is more meaningful for the United States than it
is for Russia. But the hard, bare bones, unemotional fact is that the secu-
rity of United States is much better served by making that concession
than by clinging to the option. One might reasonably take realization of
that point as a test of whether the United States has in fact emerged from
the grip of cold war mentality. 
A mutual commitment to an extensively integrated missile surveil-
lance system with comprehensive coverage would have an interesting and
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potentially constructive effect on the unresolved dispute over national
missile defense. On the Russian side the JDEC agreement is compared to
an earlier agreement announced by the American and Russian Presidents
in June of 1992 to explore a jointly operated missile defense system,
referred to in the United States as Global Protection Against Limited
Strikes (GPALS). The participating American President was, of course,
George H. W. Bush. Although the agreement called for exploration rather
than enactment, the exchange of surveillance information envisaged for
GPALS was much more extensive than that provided for under JDEC.7
It outlined an arrangement that would make immediately available to
both sides all the missile tracking data on which an interceptor would
depend other than that gathered and processed by the interceptor itself.
Since the performance of any NMD system would depend primarily on
that shared capability, the prior establishment of such an arrangement
would presumably make it much easier to work out agreed terms for suit-
ably limited interceptor deployments. The current Russian objections
have mostly to do with the potentially dangerous connection between a
limited NMD deployment and an advanced capability for preemptive
offense. If that latter element is removed from the situation and the
core procedural principle of the ABM treaty is preserved – namely, that
the essential conditions of any NMD deployment must be subject to
mutual agreement – then Russian objections to a genuinely limited
deployment could probably be negotiated away. At any rate the chances
would be much greater. 
If an extensively integrated missile surveillance arrangement were
determined to be the immediate purpose of JDEC, then more significant
incremental extensions could also be considered. It would be logical, for
example, to expand the idea of prelaunch notification to provide for
direct mutual monitoring of the operational status of all deployed mis-
siles. Such an extension would require the introduction of new sensing
and reporting technology, but the technology required is readily avail-
able. If accomplished, comprehensive prelaunch surveillance would pro-
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7 George Bush and Boris Yeltsin, Joint United States-Russian Statement on a
Global Protection System, June 17, 1992. http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/
abmt/text/b920617m.htm
vide the verification system that would undoubtedly be necessary to
remove deployed nuclear forces from alert status in a manner that both
sides would accept as reliable. Similarly it would be logical to extend
comprehensive missile surveillance to cover aircraft and space satellites
as well. In both of these areas the balance of interest is more complex
because a greater variety of military and commercial activities are
involved. If a comprehensive ballistic missile surveillance system were to
be successfully established, however, then it seems likely that
the participating parties would discover significant mutual
interests in these other areas as well. The underlying theme of
reassurance has very broad application. If practiced for the
core deterrent relationship, it would probably be extended
to additional military activities. 
At some early point, the process of creating and extend-
ing a comprehensive missile surveillance system could be
expected to include other countries as well. Because of their current
and historical involvement in missile surveillance operations, Canada,
Great Britain, Denmark and Australia are natural companions for the
United States. By the same reasoning, Belarus, Ukraine, Latvia and Azer-
baijan are natural companions for Russia. A comprehensive global
arrangement would ultimately have to include Japan, China, North
Korea, India, Pakistan, and Iran. One cannot expect to assemble that
coalition all at once, but if an expansion of JDEC participants is even-
tually to occur then it is important to have international involvement at
an early stage. The United States and Russia have explicitly acknowl-
edged the need for expansion, though not provided for it in concrete
terms, in both the JDEC agreement and the Albright-Ivanov Memoran-
dum of Understanding.8
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8 The December 2000 memorandum states that the implementation of JDEC
“will create the conditions for the preparation and maintenance of a unified
database for a multilateral regime for the exchange of [pre- and post-launch]
notifications…The Parties shall seek the participation of other countries in
providing such notifications. The Parties shall seek, as soon as possible, agree-









It must be considered unlikely that the American and Russian security
bureaucracies will seriously attempt to transform JDEC into a compre-
hensive arrangement at their own initiative. Implementing the terms of
the original agreement will be demanding enough; creation of the center
will almost certainly be seen by those directly involved as a significant
accomplishment rather than as an unresolved problem set in motion.
They are not likely to plead for higher standards. It would require an
implausible amount of insight and will for either of the presidents to
impose higher standards on the specialists who inform them. If more
advanced arrangements are to be actively explored, then the initial effort
will presumably have to be independent of the two principal govern-
ments. At any rate, the basic changes in the conception of security poli-
cy that presumably would have to accompany a categorical improvement
in JDEC could only be achieved through extensive public discussion.
Comprehensive joint surveillance is not a matter that would be entrust-
ed to any committee. It would have to vetted by the respective political
systems. 
At first glance that appears even more unlikely. There are many other
issues with greater immediate resonance preempting political attention in
both countries, especially in Russia. Nonetheless the looming collision
over NMD deployment promises to create a prominent and relevant
opportunity. That issue pits intense emotion against fundamental princi-
ple and national prerogative against international obligation. It does have
the potential both to engage and to reshape public consciousness. In
that context, the broader implications of JDEC might come to be gener-
ally realized and its constructive possibilities might be seriously pursued.
A strong connection between JDEC and NMD is forged by the core
fact that defensive technology has almost no serious chance against an
unrestrained ballistic missile assault. If the very difficult problems of in-
flight interception are to be solved at all, then both the numbers and the
overall operating characteristics of the attacking warheads have to be far
more limited than what even a modest opponent would be inherently able
to do. The necessary limitations can in principle be achieved by prior
agreement, but in that case it is prudent to presume that the defensive
deployment would have to be subjected to prior agreement as well. Alter-
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natively the necessary limitations might be achieved by preemptive attack.
Since current United States forces have a large and increasing advantage
in offensive capability, any potential opponent is forced to consider this
latter possibility. To the extent that the United States refuses to subject its
projected NMD deployment to internationally agreed limitations, it con-
veys the impression that it is actually pursuing a strategy of preemption.
That is a very threatening prospect – most immediately to China, which
has only a minimal deterrent force not held in continuous alert status.
Over the longer term it is also threatening to Russia, which cannot main-
tain a deterrent force commensurate with that of the United States. Per-
sistent American efforts to deploy an NMD system that is not assuredly
restrained by international agreement virtually compel countervailing reac-
tions from Russia and China and thereby entangle the rest of the world
in the consequences. With no plausible resolution currently in sight, the
issue seems likely to generate sufficient contentiousness to attract broad
attention and to motivate some reconsideration. In the course of that
process, the idea of a comprehensive surveillance system with the poten-
tial to limit the possibility and reduce the fear of preemptive offensive
operations might come to be generally appreciated. 
With all this considered, it seems reasonable to advance four basic
aspirations for the constructive evolution of JDEC. One can urge imple-
mentation of the RAMOS program supplemented by direct bilateral assis-
tance in upgrading the Russian surveillance system. One can urge incre-
mental improvements in JDEC operations providing for state of the art
precision in the reporting of missile launch parameters and in the impact
estimates inferred from them. One can also urge that this information be
provided for every observed missile launch, without exception, and that
it be exchanged as soon as it is available. One can additionally encour-
age the two governments to explore a supplement to the JDEC agree-
ment providing for an experiment in a comprehensive surveillance infor-
mation exchange for a limited area — in pursuit of the Russian strategy
for incremental development. And finally one can urge that an interna-
tional working group be formed to specify terms for a comprehensive
and all-inclusive missile surveillance network. The world as a whole has
a large stake in this matter and should not leave the entire burden of ini-
tiative to be carried by Russia and the United States. 
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